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Causes and correlates of intrusive memory: a
response to Clark, MacKay, Holmes and Bourne
No reader of Psychological Medicine needs to be
reminded that correlation does not imply causation,
but there are two attitudes that might be taken to
that fact, and between them a spectrum of positions.
I suspect that those holding positions towards either
end of this spectrum overestimate their view’s
preponderance, and that this explains some of the
mutual misunderstandings in our debates concerning
psychological disorder. An example may be found in
a recent exchange between me, on one hand, and
Clark, MacKay, Holmes and Bourne, on the other
(Clark et al. 2016b; Mole, 2016). Before considering
that exchange, we should consider the two contrasting
attitudes to correlation and causation. Most feasible
positions lie somewhere between these extremes, but
opinions differ as to whether the most sensible lie
nearer the first or second.
Our first attitude takes the maxim about correlation
and causation as warning of a fallacy to which humans
are prone. Just as we need to avoid the cognitive illu-
sions that lead us to ignore the base rate when asses-
sing posterior probabilities, or to treat as most likely
that which is most typical (Kahneman & Tversky,
1973, 1974), so we must avoid succumbing to our ten-
dency for treating correlations as causal (Matute et al.
2011). These illusions look persuasive, even to those
in the know (Diaconis & Freedman, 1981), but they
are nonetheless fallacious. For causal inferences to be
better than illusory, such inferences require not only
that variables are correlated: They also require some
theory of the mechanism by which the alleged caus-
ation is implemented. If the study of psychological
medicine is to take a properly scientific approach to
its causal hypotheses then it must, on this view, con-
cern itself with mechanisms.
Many theorists are sympathetic to at least some part
of this attitude (Revonsuo, 1999; Poland & Von
Eckardt, 2004; Kendler, 2008; Craver, 2009). Among
readers of this journal it might even be orthodox
(Kendler et al. 2011). But elsewhere one finds a differ-
ent attitude being taken; which also can be approbated
plausibly.
This second attitude sees correlation’s failure to
imply causation as a symptom of the fact that scientific
inference is not deductive (Popper, 1959). Observations
of correlation do not entail causal claims, but nor (for
example) did Eddington’s eclipse photographs entail
the general theory of relativity. Scientific data never
support theories by entailing them (Poincaré, 1902).
Instead a theory gets supported by the data by giv-
ing a parsimonious explanation for them (Lipton,
1991). The fact of some variables being correlated
calls for an explanation: the theory according to
which there is a causal relation between those vari-
ables frequently gives the most parsimonious explan-
ation available (Reichenbach, 1949). Correlation, on
this view, does not imply causation, but does pro-
vide appropriate evidence for it, all else being
equal. That evidence may not answer the Humean
skeptic, but he does not set the standard by which
science should be judged.
These two attitudes recommend opposite reactions
when a move is made from correlational data to a cau-
sal claim. The first sees this as a fallacy, the second as a
legitimate inference. These attitudes are, therefore, in
tension – and the position of a theorist who attempted
to adopt both would be precarious – but we should
avoid choosing between them. Both contain some
truth. The first is right that we should be wary of our
susceptibility to cognitive illusions; the second that
we should not hold scientific inference to the standard
of deductive proof. Sensible views must acknowledge
both points, but within the scope of the sensible
there is room for significant disagreements of em-
phasis. My own sympathies tend towards the first atti-
tude. Clark et al.’s (2016b) response to my letter
suggests that theirs tend to the second. Lacking a the-
ory of the mechanisms by which brain states and men-
tal states interact, I take correlations to give us only a
tentative picture of the causal structures in which
those states participate. Clark et al. (2016a, b) treat
that picture as if it were complete.
The resulting disagreement comes into focus when it
is seen against the background of our more fundamen-
tal agreement. Clark et al. (2016b) repeatedly note the
centrality of the point over which we agree, remarking
that my critique of their methodology:
has no bearing on [their] main analyses nor the interpreta-
tions and conclusions that are drawn – namely that there is
a specific peri-traumatic pattern of brain activation that pre-
dicts intrusive memory formation. (p. 1787, emphasis
added, here and in the two following quotations)
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They summarize this position by saying that:
the main aim of the original paper (and our subsequent rep-
lication) was to investigate whether the occurrence of an in-
trusive memory is determined by the neural activity during
the original encoding of experimental trauma. (p. 1788)
And the conclusion of that replication, as given in its
abstract, is that:
The left inferior frontal gyrus may be implicated in both the
encoding and involuntary recall of intrusive memories
(Clark et al. 2016a, p. 505).
I unreservedly agree with these authors’ claim that the
involuntary recall of intrusive memories is not to be
explained by reference only to processes taking place
in the period after an intrusively recollected event has
been experienced: the explanation of intrusiveness
must partly be sought in the events that take place
when an intrusively remembered episode is first
encoded. On this point the authors’ evidence is flawless.
Our dispute concerns what it is, in the initial experience
of an episode that creates its propensity for involuntary
recollection. Clark et al. (2016a, b) hold that the causes of
this propensity are not wholly emotional. I maintain
that their reasons for holding this are flawed.
More specifically, I think those reasons require too
liberal an attitude to the move from correlation to caus-
ation. That attitude can already be seen in the passages
quoted above. The first makes a point about prediction,
and so can be made true by a mere correlation. The
third makes a claim about a brain area being implicated
in the relevant psychological phenomena, and so
requires this area’s involvement in a causal operation.
The unmarked move between these is legitimate only
if our second attitude to causal inference is regnant.
These authors also remark that ‘Bourne et al. (2013)
did not claim that the secondary analysis was a math-
ematical proof, nor that it meant that emotion played
no role in intrusive memory encoding’. In taking this
disavowal of mathematical proof to be relevant, they
again seem to be adopting the second attitude.
Before asking whether their position requires an im-
plausibly strong version of that attitude, an additional
point should be noted (since the last of the above quota-
tionsraises it),whichconcerns the issuethat is supposedly
in dispute. In that last quotationwe see the authors insist-
ing that theirwork ‘didnot claim[. . .] that emotionplayed
no role in intrusive memory encoding’. They also write:
Mole (2016) argues that there are distinct emotion-based
and cognitive-based hypotheses for the formation of intru-
sive memories. He states: ‘Bourne et al. suggest that the evi-
dence given in their 2013 study favours hypotheses of this
second type’ – referring to a favouring of cognitive process-
ing over emotional processing for the formation of intrusive
memories. (Clark et al. 2016b, p. 1788)
They ‘strongly disagree’ with the claim that they take
me to attribute to them, saying that:
Unlike Mole (2016), we do not argue that these are distinct
hypotheses and explanations. Instead, we suggest the evi-
dence taken together strongly implies that emotional pro-
cessing is important for intrusive memory formation but
that other factors in addition to emotion are also important
(as we have argued elsewhere, e.g. Holmes & Bourne,
2008).
These remarks embody a misreading. The claim with
which they disagree is not among the claims I made,
nor among those that I attributed to anybody else.
Nobody denies that emotion is important to the ex-
planation of intrusiveness. As these authors say (and
as I quoted them as saying) their position is that ‘al-
though intense emotional reaction may be a necessary
condition for flashback formation it appears not to be
sufficient’. My point was that their evidence fails to
support this claim of insufficiency, not that it fails to
support some other claim, according to which emotion
plays no role. None of the hypotheses that I considered
‘favoured cognitive processing over emotional process-
ing for the formation of intrusive memories’. Those
hypotheses were (1) that: ‘intrusively remembered epi-
sodes differ from other episodes just because [of] the
emotional responses that they elicit, at the time when
they are first experienced’ (Mole, 2016, p. 1785, em-
phasis added); and (2) that ‘the initial processing of in-
trusively remembered episodes [is] marked, not only by
emotion, but also by some more purely cognitive peculiarity’
(Mole, 2016, emphasis added). The first hypotheses cite
emotion alone as the cause of intrusiveness; the second
cite emotion plus also some non-emotional factor.
Neither says that emotion ‘plays no role’. Neither
‘favours cognitive processing over emotional process-
ing’. The first say that every process that contributes
to the difference between intrusive and normal mem-
ory is an emotion-constituting process; the second
that some of these processes are non-emotional. Clark
et al. (2016b) take the second position:
We wrote that ‘although intense emotional reaction may be
a necessary condition for flashback formation it appears not
to be sufficient’ in Bourne et al. (2013; p 1529), by which we
intended to suggest that intrusive memoires [sic] are not
formed solely due to extreme emotion, but also due to a
number of other factors. In other words, heighted [sic] emo-
tion is necessary, but alone it is not sufficient, requiring the
involvement of other cognitive processes for intrusive
memory formation.
This position is plausible, but my contention continues
to be that the studies in question provide no justifica-
tion for believing it. Those studies involve an analysis
of functional magnetic resonance imaging data that is
said to provide ‘two key pieces of information’. We
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can consider the evidential status of both, taking the
second piece first.
This second piece of information is that ‘the left in-
ferior frontal gyrus and middle temporal gyrus show
activation that is not compatible with simple increasing
levels of emotionality – activity in these areas is lower
during Potential scenes than during both Control and
Actual (Intrusive) scenes’ (Clark et al. 2016b, p. 1788).
To support Clark et al.’s (2016a, b) position this infor-
mation would need to weigh against the hypothesis
according to which every process contributing to the
intrusiveness of memories is an emotion-related pro-
cess. That cannot be done by showing that some of
the centres that are involved in emotion work less
hard when processing intrusive scenes than when pro-
cessing scenes that will be recollected normally.
To see this, consider an analogy. Suppose that diners
in some restaurant occasionally become unwell, and
that a consensus has been reached that the causes of
this are to be found in processes that occur before
their food arrives at the table. One hypothesis is that
the processes responsible are those happening in the
kitchen. An alternative is that things happening in
the kitchen are insufficient, and that the front of
house staff must also play a role. The hypothesis impli-
cating the front of house staff would gain no support
from observing that some kitchen staff do the same
things, whether the diner becomes ill or not, nor
from observing that some kitchen staff work less
hard on occasions when the diner does become ill.
Similarly, when faced with the fact that some memor-
ies become intrusive (and with a consensus that events
at the time of encoding are implicated in this) there is
one hypothesis saying that the processes responsible
are in every case emotional, and another saying that
non-emotional processes must also play a role. The lat-
ter hypothesis gains no support from observing that
certain emotional processing areas do the same things,
whether the memory becomes intrusive or not, nor
from observing that some such areas are less active
on occasions when the memory does become intrusive.
If we had evidence that everyone in the kitchen does the
same thing when diners get ill and when they do not,
then the situation would be different, but to suppose
that we have evidence of that sort in the psychological
case is to suppose that the causal picture given by the
correlational data is complete. This requires that we en-
dorse the second attitude in its strongest form.
Clark et al.’s (2016b) other ‘key piece of information’
is said to be that ‘many brain regions not associated
with emotional processing are implicated (with the
acknowledged caveat of the limitations of reverse in-
ference)’ (p. 1787). Their entitlement to that ‘impli-
cated’ is the point in contention. Their evidence for it
comes from an analysis showing that the activity of
regions not associated with emotion carries informa-
tion on the basis of which predictions about intrusive-
ness can be made. All sorts of causal arrangements
might account for the accuracy of these predictions.
The activity of my barometer carries information on
the basis of which predictions can be made about the
occurrence of a storm. This does not show the barom-
eter to be implicated in the storm’s production. At
most it shows that there is some causal nexus in
which barometer and storm both participate.
The finding that some brain region responds differ-
entially to intrusive and non-intrusive scenes would
imply that something other than emotion contributes
to intrusive recollection only if the differentially
responding region played some role in bringing
about intrusive recollection, and only if the region in
question played no role in emotion. Those who favour
the first attitude to causal inference will take neither
claim to be well supported by correlational data.
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